2 commitment of the Conservative Government to replace the Human Rights Act (HRA) with a British Bill of Rights (BBoR) has been somewhat overshadowed. However, that commitment gains considerably in significance as a result of 'Brexit' since, once the UK has withdrawn from the EU, it can be presumed that the EU Fundamental Charter of Rights will no longer be applicable in domestic law 2 and the potential for the UK's human rights framework to undergo significant further amendment will be considerable. The Government's determination to repeal the HRA was reaffirmed in the 2016 Queen's Speech and, while a draft BBoR has not been published, one aspect of it can be viewed as clearly established: it will reflect long-standing Conservative hostility, not to the text of the ECHR itself, but to its attendant jurisprudence, and in particular to the 'living instrument' or 'living tree' 3 approach, which influences domestic law via s.2 HRA. That hostility was reaffirmed by Theresa May during her campaign to become the leader of the Conservative party when she attacked certain Strasbourg decisions in the 'living instrument' mode. 4 It was also reflected in the pledges, this article will examine their implications, beginning by exploring the nature of the current 'link' between the British courts and Strasbourg in s.2 HRA, and considering the extent to which that link has already been significantly weakened. It will go on to consider the basis for the Conservative proposal, and the options available to the Conservatives in breaking that link in a BBoR, taking account of the introduction of limitation clauses in a
BBoR and of the possibility of according judgments against the UK an advisory status only.
The relation between those options and the current stance taken by the judiciary to s.2 will be evaluated. Finally, taking account the European Court's recent movement towards 'enhanced' subsidiarity, it will examine the possible beneficial or negative consequences for the protection of human rights in Britain of reliance on a BBoR intended to be interpreted and applied independently of Strasbourg influence. It will take the stance that maintaining governmental accountability via the enforcement of human rights standards is a clear good, but will consider the possibility that an enrichment of rights might arise, enabling inter alia such accountability, due to the diminution of Strasbourg influence under a BBoR. It is not intended to discuss the matter of changing the relationship between Strasbourg and domestic courts and repeal of the HRA in relation to the devolved institutions since that extremely controversial issue has been side-stepped by the Conservative leadership so far. Similarly, the continued international law obligation placed on the state to abide by final judgments at Strasbourg against it under Article 46 ECHR will form a sub-theme in the article, but raises wider issues that go beyond the scope of this piece. 48 Lord Hoffmann 49 and a number of academics writing on the subject. 50 It appears then that the 'take into account only', semi-mirror principle, approach is gaining ground over the previous full mirror principle approach.
Existing exceptions under the 'semi-mirror' principle
This principle accepts then that the domestic courts can go beyond Strasbourg but in general cannot depart from the Court's decisions where it has spoken clearly on an issue. However, even that aspect of the principle has been found to admit of some exceptions. While Lewis was able to comment in 2007 that the judicial compulsion towards following the Strasbourg case law was 'practically inescapable' -and that exceptions to the presumption that relevant
Convention jurisprudence be applied were more readily found in theory than in practice 51 -the courts' approach to s.2(1) in the intervening years has steadily been modified in order to more readily reflect that discretion apparent in the wording of s.2(1) of the Act. As the grounds on which departure from the nominally- above; this possibility is considered further below. which contains a sensible mix of checks and balances alongside the rights it sets out, and is a laudable statement of the principles for a modern democratic nation. We will not introduce new basic rights through this reform; our aim is to restore common sense, and to tackle the misuse of the rights contained in the Convention'. So it appears that the aim of seeking to weaken the ties to Strasbourg via a BBoR is not to be realised via changes to the core listed rights (a position also reflected in the Bill of Rights Commission's terms of reference). These two opposing possible consequences of 'breaking the link' with Strasbourg are thrown into starker relief and pursued further in the next section, which considers complete decoupling of the domestic courts from Strasbourg.
Consequences of 'breaking the link' through repeal of the HRA

Protection for rights under the British Bill of Rights
Full de-coupling of domestic courts from Strasbourg?
De-coupling of the courts from Strasbourg could be taken to mean adhering in 's.2' BBoR to a version of the anti-mirror principle to the effect that the courts could refuse to follow necessarily produce domesticated alternatives of comparable -or greater -force. However, the force of that objection would depend on the extent to which the more recent 'appeasement'-based Strasbourg approach continues to influence decisions, and on the willingness of the domestic judges -and the capacity of domestic law -to produce such alternatives. 133 It would be counter-intuitive to suggest that recent evidence of 'going beyond' Strasbourg, would be retracted if, in considering the scope of a particular instance of rights protection, judges did not need to begin by assessing the clarity or otherwise of the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out that instances might arise in the more sensitive areas affected by the ECHR, including police powers and national security, as in A v UK in relation to Article 6, in which the corrective role of Strasbourg was pivotal. 132 Of the 14 judgments issued in 2014 to which the UK was a party, a violation was found in 4 cases (28.5%).
By comparison, of 129 cases involving the Russian Federation a violation was found in 122 (94.5%) and of the 87 decisions to which Romania was a party, breaches of the Convention were found in 74 (85.0%). More longstanding members of the Convention system were also seen to evidence high rates of violation during 2014: of 19 cases involving Belgium, a violation was found in 16 (84.2%), while of 22 cases involving France, violations were found in 17 (77.2%).
Re-enter the Common Law?
In parallel with the judicial development of an interpretation of the requirements of s.2(1) which admits of greater flexibility in the translation of Strasbourg jurisprudence into domestic law, the UK Supreme Court has also pointed towards the further development of a distinctly national source of rights protection, reiterating -in a series of recent decisions -the potential utility of the common law as a tool of rights protection. 134 Observing the tendency -prompted by the HRA -for courts and advocates to treat the Convention case-law as both the beginning and end of an enquiry into a potential infringement of rights, the Supreme
Court has sought to reaffirm the rights-protecting qualities of the common law. Appealing to the doctrine of subsidiarity, the Supreme Court has argued that the HRA did not necessarily 'supersede the protection of human rights under the common law or statute, or create a discrete body of law based upon judgments of the European court.' 135 The domestic law is therefore in the process of being re-emphasised as 'the natural starting point' for analysis of a rights question, with the Supreme Court cautioning against focusing exclusively on the Convention rights. 136 Were this tendency to become more marked after repeal of the HRA, it might render any tinkering with the wording of a new 's.2' in a BBoR irrelevant.
In the face of political antagonism towards the Convention and the European Court of Human Rights, the recent judicial embrace of common law principles can be interpreted as an attempt to emphasise the existing, and distinctly national, capacity of the courts to uphold individual rights. As Lady Hale found in Moohan 'if we are confronted with a question which
